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Abstract
Presidential elections in Korea in the eighties and nineties provide an
opportunity to examine the role of political patronage in a newly formed
democracy. We examine whether the bureaucratic reshuﬄing which ac-
companies presidential changes depends on the political connections of
bureaucrats and whether bureaucratic reassignment is associated with
changes in administrative performance. We use data on all public prose-
cutors in Korea between 1992-2000 and ﬁnd that sharing birth and school
environments with the incumbent president roughly doubled the odds of
being assigned to a range of inﬂuential positions within the Public Prose-
cutor’s Oﬃce. In the last of the three presidential regimes we consider, we
also ﬁnd that branch oﬃces with high fractions of connected prosecutors
performed poorly relative to other branches. Observations over multiple
years allow us to control for unobservable characteristics of prosecutors
and oﬃces while estimating these eﬀects of political patronage.
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11 Introduction
Political appointments of bureaucrats often make news, yet our impressions
about the extent to which political connections have inﬂuenced distribution
of talent within the government bureaucracy are formed mainly on the basis
of anecdotes and case studies rather than broad based econometric evidence.
Available case studies do suggest that political interference with bureaucratic
assignments is associated with large rents and sizable eﬃciency costs. Robert
Wade, based on interviews with farmers, bureaurcrats and contractors of the
public works department in South India estimated that between a quarter and
a half of the budget allocated for the maintenance of irrigation works found
its way back into the private purses of these oﬃcials and a sizable fraction of
these earnings were used to purchase transfers to desirable positions within the
department (Wade, 1982, 1985). Similar evidence from other countries suggests
that legislators across the world have used patronage appointments to favor
those who have provided them with political and ﬁnancial support.1
In this paper we attempt to quantify the role of political connections on
the position assignments and performance of an important set of bureaucrats
in South Korea, following the introduction of direct presidential elections in
1987. Using data on all public prosecutors in South Korea between 1992-2000,
we estimate the extent to which connections to the president through shared
schools and birth environments aﬀected the likelihood of favorable assignments.
We also study the changes in the performance of oﬃces that received these
prosecutors in order to asses the eﬃciency implications of political involvement
in bureaucratic assignments. We focus on presidential, rather than other kinds of
political connections because, in spite of the existence of the National Assembly,
power is still concentrated in presidential hands and the president is involved
in many executive decisions. We emphasize birthplace and high school ties
because these have been emphasized by sociologists and political commentators
as important in the formation of group identities in Korea. Birthplace has been
shown to be the most important predictor of electoral behavior in Korea, with
the majority of the electorate in each province voting for locally born presidential
candidates (Sun Kwang-Bae, 1997) and friendships formed in a few elite high
1Political patronage in post-war Italy is discussed in Godlen (2003). Menes (1999) provides
evidence to show that an important aspect of the functioning of machine governments in the
United States at the turn of the twentieth century was the creation of well paid jobs and
contracts in return for political support.
2schools have been shown to have long standing eﬀects.2 Finally, we feel that
public prosecutors, as a group are of special interest in this type of analysis
because the integrity of the justice system is at the heart of well functioning
democracy.
A general problem with identifying political patronage based on these types
of background characteristics is that individuals from diﬀerent regions and
schools are likely to diﬀer along other dimensions which aﬀect their performance
but are not easily observed. Some schools may be better in ways that cannot
be easily quantiﬁed, or cultural social and historical characteristics of certain
regionally concentrated communities may aﬀect skills and work habits. A pres-
ident may share a birth place, high school or university with top bureaucrats
simply because families and institutions within a particular region successfully
produce talented administrators and politicians. It is therefore important, from
the point of view of our study that we have repeated observations on individual
prosecutors and that the two presidents in power during most of our period,
Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, diﬀered in their regions of birth and edu-
cation. The longitudinal nature of our data allows us to control for unobservable
time-invariant characteristics of both prosecutors and branch oﬃces.
We ﬁnd that the presidential changes were accompanied by dramatic changes
in the patterns of personnel assignment. Political connections are shown to
matter most for the positions in strategic and politically sensitive departments
and least for the positions with seniority requirements. In 1997, the last year
that President Kim Young Sam was in power, over half of all positions which
we identify as being of strategic importance were held by public prosecutors
from his region of birth. By the year 2000 this ﬁgure had fallen to about a
quarter with most of this decline being oﬀset by an increase in numbers from
the region of the incoming president, Kim Dae Jung. We ﬁnd that the eﬀects of
these connections on assignments are strongest during the Kim Dae Jung years
at the end of our period and that regions, rather than the provinces or schools
they contain, have the largest and most systematic eﬀects on assignment. Our
work therefore supports commonly made claims of strong regional identities in
Korea.
Patronage in position assignments implies that equally able bureaucrats are
2Roh Tae Woo, who was elected president in 1987, was from the Kyongbuk High School
in Taegu (in the south east) and the beneﬁts showered on graduates from that school led to
them being called the T-K (Taegu-Kyongbuk) maﬁa (Woon-Tai Kim (2001), pp 27-30).
3not treated equally. This need not however result in a less eﬃcient bureau-
cracy. If, for instance, communication within hierarchies is made easier when
members share a common birthplace or local culture, such cliquism might ac-
tually improve performance. Menes (2003) ﬁnds, for example, that although
patronage and graft were central to the functioning of machine governments
in cities within the United States at the turn of the twentieth century, these
governments were eﬀective in providing public goods and services. To explore
eﬃciency issues, we use the number of public prosecutors aligned with an in-
cumbent president in each of roughly 50 branch oﬃces and examine whether
higher fractions aligned with the president aﬀected branch oﬃce performance.
We measure performance by the number of individuals indicted by a prosecutor
and then acquitted by the ﬁrst criminal court. These acquittals are commonly
regarded as resulting from inappropriate indictments made without adequate
evidence (Yoon, 1990). It may be that these arrests are politically motivated or
simply a result of prosecutor incompetence. What matters from our perspective
is that they reﬂect ineﬃciencies in the justice system. We ﬁnd negative eﬀects of
presidential alignment only during the presidency of Kim Dae Jung, the last of
the three presidential regimes we consider. It is hard to determine whether this
is due to lower average prosecutor ability or from greater political control over
prosecutor activities over this period. The regime of Kim Dae Jung was rocked
by large numbers of corruption scandals and the group of prosecutors aligned
with him also had relatively less illustrious educational backgrounds than those
aligned with previous presidents. Both these explanations are therefore plau-
sible and the nature of our data does not allow us to separately identify their
importance. Our evidence suggests that while political interference in the bu-
reaucracy was widespread, the circumstances in which it aﬀected performance
were more particular.
Our work is closely related to a number of recent studies that examine pri-
vate beneﬁts from political connections by combining data over multiple periods
with unexpected political changes. All these studies ﬁnd, to diﬀerent degrees,
evidence that political connections were valuable to ﬁrms and were capitalized
in their market values. Fisman (2001) ﬁnds that negative announcements on
the health status of the President Suharto in Indonesia were accompanied by
declines in the share prices of Indonesian ﬁrms, Ramalho (2003) ﬁnds the im-
peachment of the Brazilian president in 1992 had immediate but short-lived
eﬀects on the stock prices of ﬁrms whose owners had some connections to his
4family, Johnson and Mitton (2001) ﬁnd that capital controls in Malaysia fa-
vored politically connected ﬁrms and the Asian ﬁnancial crisis therefore hurt
them disproportionately and Jayachandran (2003) ﬁnds that the market value
of ﬁrms aligned with the Republic Party fell substantially when the party lost
control of the U.S. Senate. We see our study as complementing and extending
this literature in important respects. Bureaucrats are, in many ways, a natural
channel through which politicians inﬂuence ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that administrative
reassignments were an important means of political control which under some
circumstances lowered bureaucratic eﬃciency. Since both rents and better poli-
cies can change ﬁrm values, it was diﬃcult for the previous literature to address
questions of eﬃciency.
Our paper also links two issues that have been at the center of heated de-
bates about Asian development. The ﬁrst is the importance of group identities
in explaining behavior and, in particular, the role of kinship, regional and school
ties, in the formation of these identities. The second, is the exercise of political
patronage in newly formed democracies. Over the last decade, South Korea, at
least as much as any other country in the region, has witnessed a series of high
level corruption scandals implicating each of the last few presidents, their fam-
ilies, and important members of the bureaucracy. Both of the presidents which
came to power during the period we consider have had their children arrested
on charges of large-scale corruption. Kim Dae Jung, within his ﬁrst two years
in oﬃce had reshuﬄed dozens of senior oﬃcials and came under severe accusa-
tions of ﬁlling ministerial positions with oﬃcials from his home province (Hoon,
2000). In a recent survey conducted by the Korean Development Institute, a
majority of respondents believed that political connections played a bigger role
in the process of restructuring after the ﬁnancial crisis than ﬁrm competitiveness
(Korean Development Institute, 2001). We provide support for the existence of
strong regional identities and show that the patronage exercised through them
was quantitatively important.
The following section describes presidential backgrounds, political changes
and the institutional structure of the Korean Public Prosecutors Oﬃce over the
period of our study. Section 3 describes our data and empirical strategy. Section
4 presents our results and Section 5 concludes.
52 The Institutional Setting
2.1 Presidential Backgrounds and Regional Divides
South Korea has 7 major cities and 9 provinces. Regional economic diﬀerences
are large, in spite of no major ethnic or other cultural divides. The capital city of
Seoul and southeastern region are the most prosperous. The Seoul metropolitan
area houses most corporate headquarters, half of all manufacturing employment
and accounts for nearly all the population growth that has taken place during
the 1980s.3
Regional conﬂicts in Korea have deep historical roots. Regional antagonism
is particularly acute between the two south eastern provinces collectively known
as the Youngnam region, and the south western provinces collectively known as
Honam. The Japanese were believed to exploit regional sentiments and, after
Independence, government policy under the military leaders Park and Chun
was often seen as actively discriminating against Honam.4 Youngnam, with
less than 15% of the country’s population, provided 35% of South Korea’s
ministers and vice-ministers and 31% of generals between 1960 and 1988. The
owners of over 50% of Korean chaebols were from Youngnam, in contrast with
only 5% from Honam. In the seventies and eighties nearly 31% of appointed
legislators were from Youngnam as opposed to 14.5% from Honam.
On June 29th,1987, the military government, in response to widespread civil
protests, declared its intention to make major constitutional amendments and
hold presidential elections.5 This declaration speech is widely regarded as having
ushered democracy into South Korea. The constitution was amended and Roh
Tae-Woo, who was part of the preceeding military government and made the
historic June declaration, became the ﬁrst democratically elected president since
Park Chung Hee’s military coup in 1961. Presidents were restricted to single
ﬁve year terms, and we therefore observe three presidential regimes during the
period 1992-2000: In 1993, at the end of Roh’s term, Kim Young Sam came
into oﬃce, followed in 1998 by Kim Dae Jung. The ﬁrst two of these presidents
were from the southeastern region of Youngnam, while Kim Dae Jung was from
Honam. The regional identities described above were clearly reﬂected in each of
3All reported ﬁgures are based on Kim and Kim (2002)
4Lee (1990), pp 49-52.
5Manwoo Lee (1990) contains a copy of the declaration (pp. 145-148) and a description of
the events leading up to it (pp.19-44)
6these elections. Parties were divided on regional, rather than class or ideological
lines. Close to 90 per cent of the electorate in Honam, the region of Dae Jung
Kim’s birth, voted for him in each election.6
2.2 The Public Prosecutor’s Oﬃce
The Public Prosecutors’ Oﬃce is headed by the Prosecutor General. It is re-
sponsible for the investigation of crimes, the supervision of the police and other
investigative agencies, and civil lawsuits which involve the government. To be-
come a public prosecutor requires passing a judicial exam, analogous to a bar
exam in that those who pass are eligible to work as an attorney, public prose-
cutor or judge. Prosecutors then go through a two-year training course at the
Judicial Research and Training Institute. The year of entry to the institute
determines the public prosecutor’s seniority. This is an important criterion for
future promotions as high ranks within the bureaucracy have especially stringent
seniority requirements.
The incumbent administration has complete authority in prosecutor appoint-
ments and assignments, subject to seniority requirements. The President di-
rectly controls most assignments based on recommendations by the Minister of
Justice. Statements referring to the historical importance of political connec-
tions for public prosecutors can be found in speeches by presidents and bureau-
crats.7 There is also survey evidence suugesting that many Koreans attribute
injustices in the process of criminal investigation to the excessive political ori-
entation of public prosecutors.
We classiﬁed positions by relying on newspaper articles and interviews with
public prosecutors.8 We found, in fact, very little disagreement about which
6Sun Kwang-Bae notes that in the ﬁrst presidential election of 1987 ” role played by the
regional cleavage ... was thus far-reaching, in that each of the candidates clearly dominated the
others, rather than enjoying only relative advantage, in the respective regional strongholds.”
(1997, p9)
7Soon after Kim Dae Jung came to power in 1998, he addressed public prosecutors, with
the words, “I am sorry to say this, but the previous Public Prosecutors’ Oﬃce has been
controlled by the past political powers and has worked for them....I promise you that this
incumbent political power will never discriminate against you on the basis of your local origin
or school ties, and will not ask you to work for us.” (Quoted from a speech at the Ministry of
Justice, April 9, 1998.
8We rely heavily on information collected through interviews with current and retired
prosecutors by Soo Hyung Lee at the Donga Daily Newspaper (Donga Daily, Dec. 12, 2000)
and supplemented this with our own interviews.
7positions are inﬂuential. We identify three categories of desirable positions,
based on alternative criteria. We refer to these collectively as notable positions.
1. Star positions: This is the term used within the prosecutor’s oﬃce for
positions near the top of the formal Public Prosecutor’s Oﬃce hierarchy.
They require at least 10 years of legal experience and are held by less than
4 per cent of public prosecutors.
2. Seoul area positions: This category includes all positions in the Seoul
metropolitan area. Residing in Seoul is attractive both because of its
amenities and opportunities for education and employment. An average
of 18 per cent of all prosecutors were located in one of the Seoul area
oﬃces during our period.
3. Strategic positions: These are positions in one of three important depart-
ments in the Public Prosecutor’s Oﬃce: Public Security, Special Investi-
gation and Planning. These positions are held by about 5 per cent of all
prosecutors. Positions in Public Security and Special Inivestigation are
politically sensitive because they deal with “Grand Crime” (Geo Ahk),
such as corruption, election fraud, labor unrest, and anti-communist ac-
tivities.
3 Data and Empirical Strategy
Data on the rank and positions of prosecutors are available in the Annual Report
on the Nationwide Placement of Prosecutors published by the Public Prosecu-
tor’s Oﬃce. We combine these with demographic data on individual prosecutors
available in the Overview of Legal Professionals. Data on acquittals have been
taken from the Yearbook of Judicature published by the Supreme Court.
Position assignments for all but the lowest ranked prosecutors are available
for 7 out of the 9 years between 1992-2000.9 The total number of these pros-
ecutors rose over the period from 267 in 1992 to 413 in 2000. For each year,
we create alignment variables which measure the extent to which a prosecutor
shared a birth or school environment with the incumbent president. Although
we know the town of each prosecutor’s birth, we aggregate this data to the
province level, because of the small numbers born in each town. Most of our
9We were not able to get data on assignments for 1994 and 1996.
8analysis is then conducted at the level of provinces and regions. This allows
us to examine, in particular, whether eﬀects of shared provincial backgrounds
are encompassed in broader regional identities. To examine the importance of
school ties, we consider the high school from which each president graduated
and other prestigious high schools in the area with which students from these
schools are likely to have interacted. Students often travel quite far outside their
town to attend one of many prestigious Korean high schools. We therefore have
more prosecutors from these schools than we do from individual towns.
We model the likelihood of obtaining an inﬂuential position as a function
of a prosecutor’s political and human capital. Political capital depends on con-
nections with the incumbent president and human capital is captured by back-
ground characteristics such as education, experience and ability, some of which
may not be easily observable. We denote the sum of political and human capital
for prosecutor i at time period t by the latent variable y∗
it, and postulate the
following relationship:
y∗
it = γPit +
K X
k=1
βkxkit + αi + it.
P refers to political connections to the incumbent president, x1.....xK denote ob-
servable background characteristics, α captures unobserved time-invariant het-
erogeneity across prosecutors and  is an error term which may include idiosyn-
cratic factors that inﬂuence favorable assignments. A prosecutor is assigned to
a notable position of type j whenever y∗
it is above a threshold value y∗
j. These
positions are not mutually exclusive. If, for example, a prosecutor holds a high
ranked position in the Special Investigation department of the Supreme Public
Prosecutor’s Oﬃce in Seoul, all three dummy variables would be equal to 1.
Given some (symmetric) distribution of the error term, F (), the probability
of being assigned a key position can be written as:








We are interested primarily in an estimate of γ. In the presence of the incidental
parameters αi, the maximum likelihood estimator of γ will not be consistent.
We follow the approach of Chamberlain (1980) who showed, using the logit
model, that the likelihood function obtained by conditioning on the sum of the
dependent variable for each group individual, was independent of the incidental
parameters and can provide consistent estimates of the parameters of interest.
9We therefore use a conditional logit model to estimate the inﬂuence of diﬀerent
types of presidential connections on the likelihood of favorable assignments.10
Since the prosecutor ﬁxed eﬀects αi are not directly estimated, we cannot cal-
culate the marginal eﬀects of political connections on the probability of getting
a favorable assignment. Instead, we compare the odds of getting such positions
for groups with and without such connections. In practice, we estimate (1) with
three diﬀerent patronage parameters, γ1, γ2 and γ3, representing the importance
of shared regions, provinces and schools respectively. Odds ratios are calculated
for each of these separately.
To measure changes in the performance of diﬀerent branches of the Public
Prosecutor’s Oﬃce, we use acquittal rates. These refer to the proportion of in-
dividuals indicted by prosecutors at a given branch and then judged innocent at
the ﬁrst criminal court. These acquittals are commonly regarded as representing
false arrests that are often politically motivated, although they might equally
well reﬂect incompetence of the concerned prosecutor. In either case, they can
be used to reﬂect ineﬃciencies in branch oﬃce performance. We use data from
all 53 branch oﬃces where acquittals are observed. We are interested in the
extent to which high acquittal rates are related to the fraction of prosecutors at
each oﬃce with birthplace or school ties to the incumbent president. Since ob-
served acquittal rates are much higher during the last presidential regime than
in earlier years, we estimate the above model separately for two time periods,
1992-1997 and 1998-2000.
We estimate:
Ajt = γPjt +
M X
m=1
βmxmjt + αj + jt (2)
where Ajt is the acquittal rate for branch j at time t and Pjt refers to the fraction
of prosecutors at branch oﬃce j that are aligned with the incumbent president.
As before, we include connections through shared regions, provinces and high
schools and estimate each of these eﬀects separately. Time-varying branch level
characteristics that might reﬂect the ability of the group of prosecutors at that
oﬃce and its performance are denoted by x1.....xM. These include the average
rank and seniority of prosecutors assigned to the branch oﬃce and the fraction
from Seoul National University, the most prestigious university in the country.
10We favor the logit speciﬁcation over a probit model since the conditional likelihood func-
tion in the probit model is not independent of the individual ﬁxed eﬀects. See Chamberlain
(1980), Maddala (1987), Greene(2003) for discussions of consistency in the conditional logit
model.
10In addition, we allow for branch-level unobservables, and denote these by αj. We
assume these are random draws from a given distribution and are not therefore
correlated with the other explanatory variables in the model. We favor the
random eﬀects to the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator since it uses the variation across
oﬃces which is an important part of the total variation in acquittals observed in
our data. We use a Hausman speciﬁcation test to examine whether diﬀerences
in the random eﬀects and ﬁxed eﬀects estimators are statistically signiﬁcant.
We ﬁnd support for the random eﬀects speciﬁcation: there are no statistically




Some summary statistics on position assignments are presented in Table 1. The
most dramatic changes are seen in the share of prosecutors from diﬀerent back-
grounds in strategic positions. Over the course of the third presidential regime,
the share of prosecutors in these positions from the region of the incumbent pres-
ident, Kim Dae Jung, doubled from 15 to 30 per cent while the share from the
region of both the previous presidents declined from 53 to 28 per cent. Figure





















Figure 1: Public Prosecutors in Strategic Positions by Region of Birth,
1992-2000
The trends in the shares of provinces and high schools seem to be qualita-
tively similar, though somewhat less systematic. The largest changes are seen
at the end of our period during the regime of Kim Dae Jung. About 13 per
cent of prosecutors in strategic positions in 1997 were connected to Kim Dae
Jung through a shared province or high school. Three years later, this ﬁgure
had gone up to almost one-third. In contrast, there were 10 prosecutors with
high school ties to the president Kim Young Sam who held strategic positions
in 1997 and only one of them retained such a position in 2000.
Changes in the backgrounds of prosecutors holding other types of notable
positions were somewhat smaller, though qualitatively similar. The share of
prosecutors in the Seoul region who were born in Youngnam went down from 42
to 35 per cent and those from Honam went up from 18 to 25 per cent. For star
positions, the Honam share increased from 18 to 26 per cent, but this was oﬀset
largely by declines in the shares from other regions and Youngnam’s share was
almost unchanged. This is not surprising, since such positions can only be lost
through retirements, either voluntary or mandated, and changes in assignment
policies therefore take longer to manifest themselves in actual assignments. 11
11The ﬁgures are combined under the category of notable positions in Table 1.
12If we do not restrict ourselves to notable positions but consider the back-
grounds of all prosecutors in the Public Prosecutor’s Oﬃce, we observe no major
changes. Over the period there was a small decline in the share from Young-
nam (42 to 38 per cent) and a small increase in the share from Honam (19 to
21 per cent). Neither these, nor any of the provincial changes are statistically
signiﬁcant at conventional levels. There was a decline in the total number of
prosecutors with high school connections to Kim Dae Jung, and so the large
increase in the share of such prosecutors in strategic positions was oﬀset by
declines in other departments. These ﬁgures suggest that presidents reallocated
prosecutors across departments and oﬃces rather than bring about changes the
overall composition of the Public Prosecutor’s Oﬃce.
Acquittal rates, our index of branch oﬃce performance considerably in-
creased over the period. Acquittal rates are typically low (below 2% of all
cases) throughout the period, but registered a sharp rise during the last presi-
dential regime. Average rates during the Kim Young Sam years were 8% higher
than those at the start of the period, and went up by a further 19% during the
Kim Dae Jung years.




Regions Youngnam (Roh/Young Sam) .53 .54 .28
Honam (Dae Jung) .15 .13 .30
Provinces Gyoungbuk (Roh) .19 .23 .16
Gyoungnam (Young Sam) .34 .30 .13
Jeonnam (Dae Jung) .11 .11 .25
High Schools Gyoungbuk (Roh) .11 .12 .07
Gyoungnam (Young Sam) .19 .17 .08
Jeonnam (Dae Jung) .11 .10 .20
All Notable Positions
Regions Youngnam (Roh/Young Sam) .43 .41 .34
Honam (Dae Jung) .18 .18 .25
Provinces Gyoungbuk (Roh) .20 .20 .19
Gyoungnam (Young Sam) .23 .22 .16
Jeonnam (Dae Jung) .12 .11 .17
High Schools Gyoungbuk (Roh) .11 .09 .06
Gyoungnam (Young Sam) .11 .10 .06
Jeonnam (Dae Jung) .11 .11 .11
All Positions
Regions Youngnam (Roh/Young Sam) .41 .40 .38
Honam (Dae Jung) .19 .20 .21
Provinces Gyoungbuk (Roh) .20 .20 .20
Gyoungnam (Young Sam) .21 .20 .19
Jeonnam (Dae Jung) .12 .13 .14
High Schools Gyoungbuk (Roh) .08 .06 .04
Gyoungnam (Young Sam) .10 .08 .06
Jeonnam (Dae Jung) .11 .09 .07
144.2 Estimates
4.2.1 Position Assignments
Table 2 presents estimates and odds-ratios from a conditional logit model. The
probability of each type of notable position is estimated as a function of prosecu-
tor background characteristics, dummy variables for diﬀerent years, and dummy
variables for presidential alignment which take the value 1 for years in which a
prosecutor’s school, province or region matched that of the incumbent president.
The likelihood function for each notable position is constructed conditional on
the total number of years such a position is held by a prosecutor. The use of this
procedure implies that, for each type of position, we exclude prosecutors who
never held the position during the period as well as those who held it throughout
the period, because for this group, the sum of the dependent variable is not a
suﬃcient statistic for their unobserved ﬁxed eﬀect. The eﬀects of patronage are
identiﬁed through the career paths of those prosecutors who move in and out of
notable positions when presidential power changes hands. In the absence of es-
timates of the individual αis, we cannot compute marginal eﬀects. Odds-ratios
are reported.
The estimates reveal some interesting patterns. The ﬁrst is that the eﬀects
of presidential connections varied substantially across the diﬀerent categories of
notable positions. The largest eﬀects of presidential alignment are observed for
strategic positions. Eﬀects on Seoul area positions are smaller and presidential
connections have no discernable eﬀects on the star positions. Also, regional
ties that have the largest and most systematic eﬀects on favorable position
assignments. Belonging to the same region as the president more than doubled
the odds of being assigned to a position in a strategic department. Provincial
and high-school ties do not seem to have any additional eﬀects. In other words,
the inter-regional diﬀerences in patronage eﬀects that we observe in our data
are large in comparison with the intra-regional eﬀects.
It is not clear that the correct interpretation of these results is that provin-
cial and high school ties do not matter. It may just be that our measure of
patronage, namely the likelihood of an inﬂuential assignment, is too coarse to
capture the additional beneﬁts of these provincial and high school-ties. It may
be, for example, that prosecutors from the incumbent president’s region face im-
proved chances of favorable assignments, and those from who were also from the
same high-school or province received additional beneﬁts, such as jobs for their
15children or other types of transfers on which we do not have data. On the other
hand, it is also possible that incumbent political power was, to some extent,
concerned with eﬃciency. By favoring a larger set of prosecutors it could ensure
that those in important positions were both reasonably capable and suitably
aligned.
Table 2: Presidential Connections and Position Assignments: Con-
ditional Logit Estimates.
Regions Provinces High Schools
All Notable Positions .38∗∗ .06 .09
standard errors (.12) (.14) (.17)
odds-ratios (1.46) (1.06) (1.10)
Seoul positions .32∗∗ .01 -.02
standard errors (.12) (.14) (.17)
odds-ratios (1.38) (1.0) (.98)
Star positions .22 .08 .18
standard errors (.40) (.44) (.53)
odds-ratios (1.25) (1.09) (1.20)
Strategic positions .98∗∗ .08 .07
standard errors (.24) (.28) (.31)
odds-ratios (2.67) (1.08) (1.07)
Notes: Here and in Table 3 below, * and ** indicate that a coeﬃcient is statisti-
cally signiﬁcant at the 5% and 1% level respectively
4.2.2 Performance
The considerable reassignment of prosecutors which accompanied presidential
change transformed the composition of certain branch oﬃces. The Seoul dis-
trict oﬃce, for example, which is the largest branch in the country, experienced
the entry of a large numbers of prosecutors aﬃliated to Kim Dae Jung after he
came to power and the corresponding exit of those aﬃliated to earlier presidents.
The share of prosecutors in this oﬃce from Honam rose from 18% to 28%, and
those from Youngnam, the birth region of the previous two presidents, fell from
1641% to 33%. Interestingly, over this same period there was a doubling of the
fraction of those arrested by the Seoul branch oﬃce and then acquitted. Such
acquittals usually result from arrests with insuﬃcient evidence and can there-
fore represent ineﬃciencies in the functioning of the Public Prosecutor’s Oﬃce.
To examine whether the reassignments that accompanied presidential changes
were systematically accompanied by changes in acquittal rates, we combine our
data on prosecutor backgrounds and assignments with branch oﬃce data on
acquittals. We estimate the eﬀects of presidential alignment on acquittal rates
using a random-eﬀects model. These results are presented in Table 3. We also
provide p-values from a Hausman speciﬁcation test based on a comparison of
coeﬃcients from the random eﬀects model and the corresponding ﬁxed eﬀects
speciﬁcation. These justify our use of random eﬀects.
We ﬁnd that increases in the fraction of aﬃliated prosecutors were accompa-
nied by higher acquittal rates during the last presidential regime, but not under
the ﬁrst two presidents. As can be seen from Table 3, this is true whether we
look at the fraction of aﬃliated prosecutors in all positions or focus only on the
changes in aﬃliated prosecutors in strategic positions. A one standard deviation
change in the fraction of regionally aﬃliated prosecutors at a branch oﬃce dur-
ing the period 1998-2000 is associated with a change of two-ﬁfths of a standard
deviation in acquittal rates. The size of these eﬀects are much larger for the
strategic positions, however the coeﬃcient for regions in this case is statistically
signiﬁcant only at the 10% level.
The negative eﬀects of political patronage on the performance of the Public
Prosecutor’s Oﬃce observed during the last of our three presidential regimes
may be indicative of greater political interference with these bureaucrats during
this regime or it may simply be a result of less competent bureaucrats being
moved into inﬂuential positions. During the ﬁrst two regimes, 80 per cent of
prosecutors in inﬂuential positions were graduates of Seoul National University
in contrast to only 61 per cent during the Kim Dae Jung years. The last of
our 3 regimes also witnessed an unprecedented number of corruption scandals
involving the president’s family, so both these explanations seem plausible.
17Table 3: Acquittal Rates and the Composition Branch Oﬃces:
Random Eﬀects Estimates







High Schools .0003 -.02
(.011) (.042)






High Schools .003 -.006
(.002) (.003)
Hausman p-value .85 .61
observations 203 158
acquittal rates µ=.006, σ.=.003
fraction aﬃliated by region µ=.21, σ.=.20
Notes: Standard-errors are in parentheses below the coeﬃcients.
5 Discussion
Authoritarian governments that had controlled the Korea for most of the post
war years gave way, in the late 1980s, to elected presidents who maintained
considerable executive power. We exploit the frequent presidential changes in
18the newly formed Korean democracy to understand the role played by political
connections on career paths and performance within the bureaucracy.
We use panel data on the population of public prosecutors in Korea be-
tween 1992 and 2000 and measure political connections by the extent to which
prosecutors shared schools and birth places with incumbent presidents. The
imposition of single ﬁve year terms for each president resulted in two presi-
dential changes during the period of our study and we identify the importance
of regional and school networks by examining whether position reassignments
tracked presidential changes in systematic ways.
We ﬁnd that shared regional backgrounds have been an important deter-
minant of political patronage in Korea. Belonging to the same region as the
incumbent president more than doubled a prosecutor’s odds of being assigned
to strategic positions within the bureaucracy. Closer ties through provinces
and high schools do not have any additional explanatory power in our data. It
may be that favoring those with closer ties below the level of the region would
have made it diﬃcult to maintain capable prosecutors in inﬂuential positions.
It could also be that connections at these levels resulted in other beneﬁts which
we do not observe in our data.
A natural question in this context is whether the eﬃciency eﬀects of these
changed allocations are large. We relate acquittal rates in branch oﬃces, com-
monly regarded as inversely related to performance, to the fraction in those
oﬃces that are connected to the incumbent president. We ﬁnd high acquittal
rates accompany high fractions of connected prosecutors in one of our 3 presi-
dential regimes. Not surprisingly, our analysis suggests that the extent to which
patronage in bureaucratic assignments aﬀects the eﬃciency of the bureaucracy
depends on who is in power and the characteristics of those being favored.
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